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Abstract
We study policy reforms aimed at overhauling retirement financing. We develop
a novel approach by considering optimal reforms: policy reforms that minimize the
cost for the government while respecting the distribution of welfare in the economy.
Our model is an OLG model with life-cycle features and bequest motives where in-
dividuals are heterogeneous in their earning ability and mortality. Theoretically, we
show that due to the negative correlation between earnings ability and mortality, post-
retirement distortions to saving decisions are a robust feature of any optimal policy.
We, then, use this framework to quantitatively analyze optimal reforms. Our quanti-
tative exercise shows that an optimal reform relative to the status-quo must have three
key features: First, post-retirement assets must be subsidized while bequests must be
taxed. On average, optimal marginal subsidies on assets for individuals above age
65 is 3.2 percent, while optimal marginal tax on their bequest is 60 percent. Second,
pre-retirement transfers must increase while social security benefits must become less
generous in the aggregate and more progressive towards low income groups. Finally,
earnings tax reform does not contribute to optimal reforms, i.e., optimal marginal
taxes on earnings remain very close to the status-quo. The optimal policies reduce the
present discounted value of net tax and transfers to each generation by 15 percent.
∗We would like to thank Berthold Herrendorf valuable comments and discussions.
Please visit http://www.public.asu.edu/~rhossein for updates.
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1 Introduction
Government in the United State has a big part in financing retirement consumption. So-
cial security benefits are 40 percent of all income of the elderly. These benefits are the
main source of income for half of the elderly population. 1 Currently, social security pay-
outs are 30 percent of government expenditures and payroll taxes are 30 percent of total
federal income taxes collected. The coming demographic shift will soon tilt the balance
towards more outlays and less revenue. This will pose a significant fiscal challenge on
the government budget. The severity of these costs together with an aging population
has made reforms in the retirement system a necessity. Any reform, in order to be most
effective, must contain three ingredients: 1. a reform of the tax and transfer system, 2. a
reform of the saving incentives induced by the tax code, 3. respect distributional concerns
in a politically viable fashion.
Various reforms by policy makers and academics have been proposed as policy alter-
natives that either reduce the cost of retirement financing, or increase revenues for the
government. Some examples include: privatization of social security, lower capital and
labor taxes and a phasing out of social security and medicare, higher cap on payroll, etc.
to name a few.2
In this paper, we propose a new approach to policy reform regarding retirement fi-
nancing by considering optimal reforms. To do so, we look for optimal government tax
and transfer policies that respect the distributional concerns in the population. In other
words, we find policies that minimize the present value of outlays net of receipts for the
government while respecting the status-quo distribution of welfare. In doing this we do
not impose any restriction on the set of policy instruments at the outset. This approach
has two advantages. First, it allows us to identify which policies are the most important
in a reform. Second, it allows us to separate the notion of policy reform from that of
redistribution.
Our key findings regarding the main ingredients of an optimal reform are as follows.
First, post retirement assets must be subsidized while bequests must be taxed. On av-
erage, optimal marginal subsidies on assets for individuals above age 65 is 3.2 percent,
while optimal marginal tax on their bequest is 60 percent. Second, pre-retirement trans-
fers must increase while social security benefits must become less generous in the aggre-
1Social security benefits are more than 83 percent of income for half of the elderly population (see Table
6 in Poterba (2014)).
2Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) study the effect of social security privatization, McGrattan and Prescott
(2013) study a proposal of phasing out the social security and medicare tax and transfers , Blandin (2015)
studies the effect increasing maximum taxable earning cap.
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gate and more progressive towards low income groups. Finally, earnings tax reform does
not contribute to optimal reforms, i.e., optimal marginal taxes on earnings remain very
close to the status-quo.
Our framework for optimal reform is an overlapping generations economy with life
cycle features. In our model, individuals differ in two aspects: (a) productivity profiles
that evolve with age and determine individuals earning ability at each age and (b) mortal-
ity profiles that determine probability of death at each age. The novel feature of our anal-
ysis is the negative correlation between income (or earning ability) and mortality. This
assumption is motivated by a large number of studies documenting higher death rates
at any age for individuals in lower income groups.3 Other key features of our model are
that individuals have preference over bequest and retirement age is exogenous.
As we show, this model is able to match basic characteristics of the distribution of
consumption, earnings and bequests given the absence of annuity markets and the status-
quo tax/transfer and social security system in the United States. 4 In our optimal reform
exercise, we take as given the distribution of welfare implied by this model. We then solve
a planning problem that minimizes the present discounted value of net transfers to each
cohort in steady state subject to two constraints: i) individual’s incentive compatibility
(which is equivalent to saying that any policy we consider is consistent with individual
optimization and their budget constraint); ii) the resulting allocation delivers life time
welfare to each individual that is not lower than their lifetime welfare in the status-quo
economy.
Our first main policy reform is a direct consequence of the negative correlation be-
tween mortality and productivity.5 To understand the role of asset distortions late in life,
consider first the hypothetical situation where markets are complete and individuals can
purchase annuity and life insurance.6 Due to a lower mortality, more productive indi-
viduals place more value on future consumption relative to less productive individuals.
Therefore, if the annuity income of a low income individual is taxed, the high ability
individuals choose to earn higher when young and benefit from lower (effective) taxes
on their asset income in older ages when they survive with a higher probability.7 Not
3See for example Waldron (2013) and Cristia (2009), Rogot et al. (1992), Duggan et al. (2007) and Brown
(2001) among many others.
4The assumption about the annuity market is motivated by a large literature that documents the small
private annuity market in the United States (see Benartzi et al. (2011) for an excellent review).
5In the absence of this assumption the usual Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) uniform commodity taxation
holds there is no inter-temporal distortion.
6In our model, life insurance demand comes from individuals’ bequest motives.
7This result is similar to the insights from optimal commodity taxation as in Saez (2002) and Golosov
et al. (2013).
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surprisingly, distortions to the inter-temporal margin are larger late in life since the prob-
ability of death is higher and the heterogeneity in survival is more pronounced.
When markets are incomplete and individuals do not have access to annuities, the
above mentioned distortions must be corrected to reflect the effect of missing annuity
markets. In particular, individuals must receive subsidies on their savings upon sur-
vival. This subsidy reflects the fact that the non-contingent return on saving is too low.
Hence, optimal asset taxes are a combination of the correctional subsidies and the taxes
discussed in the previous paragraph. The former is higher the higher is mortality rate
while the latter is higher the higher is mortality differentials. Since mortality differentials
are lower in magnitude than mortality levels, assets must be subsidized at the optimum
for individuals who survive. The logic for taxing bequests and life insurance is exactly
the reverse. That is, in the absence of the annuity market, individuals hold too much asset
due to precautionary motive. To reduce this incentive (without undoing the incentive and
correction effect of asset subsidies), bequest must be taxed.
Guided by these qualitative analysis, we propose an optimal system of tax and trans-
fers. The key ingredients of our proposed policy are nonlinear subsidies on assets as long
as individuals are alive, and nonlinear taxes on their bequeathed assets when they die.
As argued in the previous paragraph, mortality rate and mortality rate differentials are
important determinants of these taxes and subsidies. Therefore, these optimal tax func-
tions vary by age. We find that optimal asset subsidies are progressive. At any age, the
subsidies that asset poor individuals receive (as fraction of their total asset) is higher than
the subsidies that asset rich individuals receive. As an example, a 70 years old person
with very low asset balance receives an average subsidy of 5 percent (on entire asset),
while an asset rich individual at the same age, receives as low as 1 percent . The mag-
nitude of subsidies increase with age. For example, average subsidies at the bottom and
top of wealth distribution at age 80 is 15 percents and 2 percent respectively. Overall, the
average marginal subsidy rate on assets range from 2 percent at age 65 to 5 percent at age
90.
On the flip side, optimal tax on bequests are regressive. In particular, the tax rates at
the bottom of the wealth distribution (for all ages) equal to 100 percent and fall to lower
levels for richer individuals (60 percent for 65 year olds at the top of wealth distribution
and below 10 percent for same individuals in their 90s). Overall, the average marginal tax
on bequest falls from about 90 percent at age 65 to 40 percent at age 90 (over all individual
who die at each age).
Our main optimal policy reform has very little direct effect on government budget. Un-
der the optimal policy, the government pays around 5 percent of GDP in asset subsidies,
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while it collects about 4 percent of GDP from taxes on bequests. However, the combi-
nation of the asset subsidies and bequest taxes greatly improves individuals’ incentive
to save. This results in a higher stock of capital in the economy which in turn generates
more revenue from taxation of corporate income. This added revenue together with high
taxes on bequests is enough to finance asset subsidies.
Our exercise also points toward the required reform in the government’s tax and trans-
fer policy. With regards to taxes, an interesting outcome is that earnings tax schedules
almost remain unchanged between the status-quo economy and the solution of our opti-
mal policy problem. That is given the observed preference for redistribution - as a con-
sequence of the political process - labor taxes are not far from optimal. With regards to
transfers, our model’s main implication is that while the aggregate government transfers
(to individuals pre- and post- retirement) should not change, its timing must change sig-
nificantly. In particular, transfers pre-retirement must increase by 87 percent while social
security benefits should decline by 14 percent.
Asset subsidies are central to our proposed optimal policy. These subsidies resemble
some of the features of the US tax code, and indeed retirement system. Tax breaks for
home ownership, retirement accounts (eligible IRAs, 401(k), 403(b), etc.) as well as subsi-
dies for small business development are few examples of such programs. The estimated
cost of these programs is $367 billion in year 2005 (about 2.8 percent of GDP). Moreover,
the benefit from these programs goes mostly to higher income individuals. 8 One view
of our proposed optimal policy is to extend and expand such policies to include broader
asset categories and, more importantly, continue during the retirement period. Our result
also highlights the need for progressivity in these subsidies (contrary to current observed
outcome). An important feature of the US tax code is that it penalizes accumulation of
asset in tax deferred accounts beyond the age of 7012 . However, US tax code imposes no
tax on transferring the balance on these accounts in the event of death. These features are
completely at odd with optimal policy.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to various strands in the literature on policy reform. We contribute
the large growing literature that studies retirement financing. Most of this literature stud-
ies the implications of a specific set of policy proposals. For example, Nishiyama and
Smetters (2007) studies the effect of privatization of social security, Kitao (2014) compares
different combination of tax increase and benefit cuts within the current social security
8See Woo and Buchholz (2006).
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system, McGrattan and Prescott (2013) propose phasing out social security and medicare
tax and transfers, and Blandin (2015) studies the effect of increasing earnings cap. An im-
portant benefit of our optimal reform approach is that we do not restrict the set of policies
at the outset. Therefore, our results can inform us about which policy instrument is an
essential part of a reform. For example, we find that changing the marginal tax rates on
labor earnings is not a major contributor to an optimal policy reform. Almost, all other
papers in the literature study policies that affect earnings taxes.
Our paper is also related to a large literature on optimal policy design. The common
approach in this literature is to take stand on a specific social welfare criteria and find
optimal polices that maximize the social. For example, Conesa and Krueger (2006) and
Heathcote et al. (2014) study the optimal progressivity of tax formula for a paramedic
set of tax functions while Fukushima (2011), Huggett and Parra (2010) and Heathcote
and Tsujiyama (2015) do the same using a Mirrleesian approach that does not impose
parametric restriction on policy instruments (similar to our paper). One drawback of this
approach is that it relies on the choice of social welfare function. As a result, it is hard to
separate the redistribution aspects of the optimal policy from efficiency gains. The benefit
of our approach is that it does not rely on a welfare function and it holds distribution of
welfare in the economy as given. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that
proposes this approach to optimal policy reform in a dynamic quantitative setting. 9
Our paper also makes a contribution to the literature on dynamic optimal taxation
over the life cycle. Similar to Weinzierl (2011), Golosov et al. (forthcoming) and Farhi
and Werning (2013) we provide analytical expressions for distortions and summarize in-
sights from those expressions. However, unlike these cited works who focus on labor
distortions over life cycle, our focus is on inter-temporal distortions. Furthermore, we
emphasis the role for policy during the retirement period. This also relates our work
to Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), who study the optimal design of disability insurance
system, and Shourideh and Troshkin (2015), who focus on an optimal tax system that
provides incentive for efficient retirement age.
Golosov et al. (2013), Saez (2002) and Piketty and Saez (2013) argue that when high
earners prefer certain types of goods, taxation of these goods can contribute positively
to redistribution and should be used. While our result has a similar flavor, there is a
key difference. That mortality not only affects preferences (through calculation of future
expected utility) but also it affects resources. In particular, in our model, absent hetero-
geneity in labor productivity, there will be no inter-temporal distortion, even in presence
of mortality differentials. This is not necessarily true when the only difference across in-
9See Werning (2007) for a theoretical analysis in a static framework.
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dividuals is preference heterogeneity. In this regard our paper is close to Bellofatto (2015)
who uses the correlation between ability and life expectancy in a dynastic framework to
study the optimal estate taxation and inter-generational transfers.
Finally, this paper is related to literature that studies the role of social security in pro-
viding longevity insurance. Hubbard and Judd (1987), I˙mrohorogˇlu et al. (1995) and
Hong and Ríos-Rull (2007) and Hosseini (2015) (among many other) have examined the
welfare enhancing role of providing annuity income through social security when there
is imperfections in the private annuity insurance market. Caliendo et al. (2014) point out
that because social security does affect individual’s inter-temporal trade-offs, its welfare
enhancing role in providing annuitization is limited. In the current paper, we precisely
point to the optimal distortions and policies that address this shortcoming in the system
by pointing out that any optimal retirement system (whether public, private or mixed)
must include features that affect individuals’ inter-temporal decisions on the margin. In
our proposed implementation that takes the form a nonlinear subsidy on assets.
2 Model
In this section, we develop a heterogenous-agent overlapping generations model suit-
able for our policy analysis. We calibration this model in Section 4 and show that it is
consistent with US aggregate data and cross section observations on earnings and asset
distribution.
2.1 Demographics and Endowment
Time is discrete and the economy is populated by T overlapping generations. The popu-
lation grows at a constant rate n. A cohort of individuals are born in each period. Upon
birth, each individual draws a type θ ∈ Θ = [θ, θ] from a continuous distribution F(θ)
that have density f (θ) This type parameter determines the individual’s labor productiv-
ity profile over the course of the life-cycle together with the distribution of survival. In
particular, an individual of type θ, has labor productivity of ϕt(θ) at age t. We often refer
to θ as life-time productivity. Everyone retires at age R and ϕt(θ) = 0 for t > R. 10
An individual of type θ has survival rate pt+1(θ) (this is the probability of being alive
in age t + 1, conditioned on being alive at age t). Nobody survives past age T (with
10Most of our analysis is done for an economy in steady state. Therefore, we drop the dependence of
allocations to calendar date and t represents age of the individual.
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pT+1(θ) = 0 for all θ). Unconditional probability of survival to each age t is
Pt (θ) = Πts=0ps (θ) .
Let µt(θ) be fraction of type of θ population that has age t and is alive. Therefore, Type θ
at age t makes up fraction f (θ) · µt(θ) of the population total population
µt+1(θ) =
pt+1(θ)
1+ n
· µt(θ),
T
∑
t=0
ˆ
θ
f (θ) · µt(θ)dθ = 1,
T
∑
t=0
µt(θ) = 1 ∀θ.
2.2 Preferences and Technology
Individuals have preferences over consumption, leisure and have joy-of-giving bequests
motive and have time (and state) separable utility function
T
∑
t=0
βtPt (θ) [u(ct)− v(lt) + β (1− pt+1 (θ))w(bt+1)] , (1)
where β is the subjective discount factor, Pt (θ) is probability of survival to age t and
1− pt+1 (θ) is mortality rate at end of age t. Individual who is alive at age t, enjoy living
bequest on bt+1 if he dies at the end of period.
We assume that the economy-wide production function uses capital and labor and is
linear. That is, output at each date is given by (r˜ + δ)K + L where K is aggregate stock of
capital and L is the aggregate effective units of labor.11 Effective labor is defined as labor
productivity, ϕt (θ) multiplied by lt while its aggregate value is the sum of effective labors
across all individuals alive in each period. In other words,
L =
ˆ T
∑
t=0
µt (θ) ϕt (θ) lt (θ) dF (θ) ,
where lt (θ) is the labor supply by an individual of type θ at age t.
11We normalize the wage per effective unit of labor to 1.
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2.3 Markets and Government
We assume that individuals supply labor in the labor market and earn wage w = 1 per
unit of effective labor. In addition, individuals have access to a risk-free asset. Upon their
death, the risk-free assets convert to bequests. In other words, we assume that annuity
markets do not exist. This assumption is in line with the observed low volume of trade in
annuity markets in the United States and other countries.
The government uses non-linear taxes on earnings from supplying labor - including
the social security tax - while we assume that there is a linear tax on capital income and
consumption. The government uses the revenue from taxation to finance transfers to
workers and social security payments to retirees. While transfers are assumed to be equal
for all individuals, social security benefits are not and depend on individuals lifetime
income.
Given the above market structure and government policies, each individual faces a
sequence of budget constraints of the following form
(1+ τc) ct + at+1 =
(
ϕtlt − Tsy (ϕtlt) + Trst
)
1 [t < R]
+ (1+ r˜ (1− τk)) at + Sst (Yt) 1 [t ≥ R] , (2)
bt = (1+ r˜ (1− τk)) (at+1 + B)− Tsb ((1+ r˜ (1− τk)) at+1) . (3)
where Tsy (·) is the income tax function on earnings from labor, Trst are transfers to working
individuals, Sst is retirement benefit from the government, and T
s
b (·) is taxes on bequests –
superscript s stands for status-quo. We assume that bequests are collected and distributed
as lump-sum transfer B to the entire population. The dependence of retirement benefits
on life-time earnings is captured in Yt which is given by
Yt =
1
R + 1
R
∑
t=0
ϕtlt.
The rate τK is the effective marginal tax rate on capital gains. Since, r˜ is the return on cap-
ital net of depreciation before any taxation in the corporate sector, τK should be thought
of as the combination of all the distortions caused by the corporate income tax code, and
capital gain taxes. Our optimal reform exercise, does not contain an overhaul of the cap-
ital tax schedule. As a result, in our economy, we take as given the after tax interest rate
earned on all types of assets which we refer to as r. We assume that the government taxes
household’s holding of government debt at an equal rate and therefore, the interest paid
on government debt is r.
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Given the above assumptions, government budget constraint is given by
τC
ˆ T
∑
t=0
µt (θ) ct (θ) dF (θ) + τK r˜K +
ˆ T
∑
t=0
µt (θ) Tsy (ϕt (θ) lt (θ)) dF (θ)
+
ˆ T
∑
t=0
µt (θ) (1− pt+1 (θ)) Tsb ((1+ r) at+1 (θ)) dF (θ) =
ˆ R
∑
t=0
µt (θ) Trst dF (θ) +
ˆ T
∑
t=R+1
µt (θ) Sst (Yt (θ)) dF (θ) + G + (r− n)D. (4)
In addition, G is per-capita government purchases while D is per-capita government
debt – thus its interest should be adjusted for the fact that population is growing at rate
n. Finally goods and asset market clearing implies that
ˆ T
∑
t=0
µt (θ) ct (θ) dF (θ) + G + nK = r˜K +
ˆ T
∑
t=0
µt (θ) ϕt (θ) lt (θ) dF (θ) (5)
K =
ˆ T
∑
t=0
µt (θ) (at (θ) + B) dF (θ)− D (6)
B =
ˆ T
∑
t=0
µt (θ) (1− pt+1 (θ)) (at+1 (θ)) dF (θ) (7)
where K is the steady-state level of per capita capital.12
Equilibrium. A steady-state equilibrium of this economy is thus defined as allocations
where individuals maximize 1 subject to (2) and (3) while government budget constraint
(4), market clearings (5) and (6) must hold.
This sums up our description of the economy. In the next section, we describe our
approach to analyze optimal reform within the framework specified above. Note that at
this point, we have not specified any details about the status-quo policies yet. We will
do that in Section 4 where we impose detailed parametric specifications of the US tax
and social security policies and calibrate this model to the US data. We can then apply
our optimal reform approach to the calibrated model and conduct our optimal reform
exercise.
When the tax function and social security benefits are calibrated to those for the United
States, we refer to the resulting equilibrium allocations and welfare as status-quo alloca-
tions and welfare. We refer to the status-quo welfare of an individual of type θ by Ws (θ).
12Equation (5) is the national accounting identity with the term δK is omitted from both sides.
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3 Optimal Policy Reform: Theoretical Framework
Our optimal policy reform exercise builds on the positive description of the economy in
Section 2. In particular, we use the distribution of welfare implied by the model in Section
2 and consider a planning problem that minimizes cost of delivering this distribution of
welfare, the utility profile {Ws (θ)}θ∈Θ, while allowing for a general set of policies. This
approach allows us to separate distributional concerns from efficiency concerns.
3.1 A Planning Problem
The set of policies that we allow for in our optimal reform are very similar to those de-
scribed in Section 2. In particular, we allow for non-linear and age-dependent taxation of
assets as well as that of bequests. Moreover, we allow for non-linear and age-dependent
taxation of labor income together with flat social security benefits, i.e., social security ben-
efits are independent of life-time earnings. Therefore, given this tax and benefit structure,
each individual maximizes utility (1) subject to the following budget constraints:
(1+ τc) ct + at+1 =
(
ϕtlt − Ty,t (ϕtlt)
)
1 [t < R] + (1+ r) at − Ta,t ((1+ r) at) + St, (8)
bt = (1+ r) at+1 − Tb,t ((1+ r) at+1) . (9)
The planning problem associated with the optimal reform, finds the policies described
above to maximize the net revenue for the government, i.e., present value of receipts net
of expenses. In this maximization, the government is constrained by the optimizing be-
havior by individuals - as described above, feasibility of allocations, and the requirement
that each individuals’ utility must be above Ws (θ). We also focus on the steady problem
for the government and ignore issues related to transition.13
Implementability. We use the primal approach a la Lucas and Stokey (1983) to solve
the optimal reform problem. The primal approach transforms the problem of finding
optimal policies to that of finding optimal allocations. However, due to the optimizing
behavior and the fact that policies cannot depend on individual characteristics, the op-
timizing behavior by individuals imposes a constraint on the planning problem. This
constraint can be written solely in terms of individual allocations and is described by the
following lemma:
Lemma 1. Consider an allocation {ct (θ) , lt (θ) , bt (θ)} that maximizes individual preferences
(1) subject to the constraints (8) and (9) for a given set of taxes. Let U (θ) be the utility associated
13We will consider the transition from one steady-state to another in the future revisions.
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with such an allocation. Then we must have
U′ (θ) =
T
∑
t=0
βtPt (θ)
[
ϕ′t (θ) lt (θ)
ϕt (θ)
v′(lt (θ)) +
P′t (θ)− P′t+1 (θ)
Pt (θ)
βw(bt+1 (θ))
]
(10)
+
T
∑
t=0
βtP′t (θ) [u (ct (θ))− v (lt (θ))] .
The proof can be found in the appendix.
Equation (10) is the envelope condition associated with the individual optimization
problem. Mechanically, one can replace yt = ϕtlt in the budget constraints, (8) and (9).
This implies that the budget constraints are independent of θ. Thus, the envelope condi-
tion associated with the optimization problem can be derived by simply differentiating
the objective with respect to θ. We refer to (1) as the implementability constraint.
The above implementability constraint is reminiscent of the local incentive compatibil-
ity constraint in the New Dynamic Public Finance and the mechanism design literature.
In fact, if instead of solving the policy problem described above, one solves the mecha-
nism design problem when θ is private information, the exact same constraint is derived.
It, however, remains to be shown that if an allocation satisfies (10), it must be the
solution of individual optimization given some tax function. Unfortunately, we cannot
theoretically show that this result is true. In section 3.3, we show that if an allocation
satisfies (10) and certain monotonicity constraints are satisfies, then a set of tax functions
can be constructed so that the allocations satisfy first order conditions associated with the
individual optimization and the budget constraints.
Planning Problem. Our planning problem maximizes the revenue from delivering
a steady-state allocation subject to the implementability constraint (10) and a minimum
utility requirement given by
max
ˆ T
∑
t=0
Pt (θ)
(1+ r)t
[
ϕt (θ) lt (θ)− ct (θ)− 1− pt+1 (θ)1+ r bt+1 (θ)
]
dF (θ) (11)
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subject to
U (θ) =
T
∑
t=0
βtPt (θ) [u(ct (θ))− v(lt (θ)) + β (1− pt+1 (θ))w(bt+1 (θ))] (12)
U′ (θ) =
T
∑
t=0
βtPt (θ)
[
ϕ′t (θ) lt (θ)
ϕt (θ)
v′(lt (θ)) +
P′t (θ)− P′t+1 (θ)
Pt (θ)
βw(bt+1 (θ))
]
(13)
+
T
∑
t=0
βtP′t (θ) [u (ct (θ))− v (lt (θ))] .
U (θ) ≥ Ws (θ) (14)
The objective in the above optimization problem is proportional to the present value of
government receipts net of outlays, i.e., its primary surplus. 14
3.2 Efficient Distortions
Our analysis of optimal taxes can be informed by studying wedges implied by the solu-
tion to the above planning problem. By this, we mean the magnitude of distortions to the
individuals’ trade-off between consumptions and earnings, consumptions and bequests
and consumption across periods. These are useful statistics about optimal allocation that
inform us about the properties of optimal taxes.
The distortion to consumption-earning margin or labor wedge for each individual of
type θ is defined by
τlabor,t (θ) = 1−
v′ (lt (θ))
ϕt (θ) u′ (ct (θ))
.
Intuitively, τlabor,t (θ) is the fraction of earning on the margin that is taken away from
the individual in terms of period t consumption. The wedge to allocation of consumption
across periods is less straightforward to define. In particular, the definition of distortions
depends on the type of asset held by the individual. Three assets are of particular interest:
1. A non-contingent asset that pays a return 1+ r independent of the individual’s sur-
vival for which the wedge is defined by
τun,t (θ) = 1− u
′ (ct (θ))
β(1+ r) [pt+1 (θ) u′ (ct+1 (θ)) + (1− pt+1 (θ))w′ (bt+1 (θ))]
14Our planning problem is related to the one solved by Huggett and Parra (2010). There, the authors
take present discounted value of tax and transfers to a generation in the status-quo economy as given and
find allocation that maximizes the utilitarian social welfare function that cost no more than the status-quo
allocation (in terms of present discounted value of net transfers to a generation). Our planning problem,
instead, takes distribution of welfare in status-quo economy as given and finds the least cost way of deliv-
ering those welfares.
13
Note that the proceed from this asset in case of death is left as bequests. We refer to
this as saving wedge.
2. An annuity that pays a return 1 + r only in case of survival and it is priced at an
actuarially fair price, pt+1 (θ), given by
τannuity,t (θ) = 1−
u′ (ct (θ))
β(1+ r)u′ (ct+1 (θ))
,
which we refer to as the annuity wedge. The above can be interpreted as a tax im-
posed on income from an annuity purchased at actuarially fair price of 1−pt+1(θ)1+r .
3. A Life insurance contract that pays 1 + r in the event of death. We can define a
life-insurance wedge similar to the annuity wedge:
τlife insurance,t (θ) = 1−
u′ (ct (θ))
β (1+ r)w′ (bt+1 (θ))
.
The above can be interpreted as a tax imposed on income from life insurance pur-
chased at actuarially fair price of 1−pt+1(θ)1+r .
Note that the above wedges are hypothetical since we do not allow for annuity and life-
insurance holdings in our implementation. Nevertheless, they are informative in terms
of separating the different roles that taxes play: incentive provision (in case of above
wedges) vs. completing the markets (as we describe later).
The following lemma characterizes optimal labor wedge:
Lemma 2. The labor wedges implied by the efficient allocation are given by
τlabor,t (θ)
1− τlabor,t (θ)
=
ϕ′t (θ)
ϕt (θ)
1− F (θ)
f (θ)
(
1
εF,t (θ)
+ 1
)
g (θ)
1− g (θ) 1−F(θ)f (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
(15)
where
g (θ) =
ˆ θ¯
θ
u′ (c0(θ))
u′ (c0(θ′))
[
1− γ (θ′) u′ (c0(θ′))] dF (θ′)1− F (θ) , (16)
εF,t (θ) =
v′(lt(θ))
v′′(lt(θ))lt(θ) is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and γ (θ) is the multiplier on the
constraint (14).
The above formula is the familiar formula from the static optimal taxation literature
as in Mirrlees (1971), Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001). The first term in (15) captures the
tail property of the distribution at a given age, t. Intuitively, if marginal tax for type θ
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increases at age t, it leads to a marginal output loss of ϕt (θ) f (θ). However, it relaxes
the incentive constraints on all the type above at age t (captured by ϕ′t (θ) (1− F(θ))).
The second term is capturing the behavioral response to taxes. The higher the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, the larger is going to be the response to higher taxes. Finally,
the last term is the social marginal welfare weight (see Piketty et al. (2014))and captures
the re-distributive motive of the government. One way to think about the last term is that
it is capturing the redistributive motives embedded in the status-quo tax and transfer
schedule. Note that this term should be adjusted since individuals might not survive
before retirement – the denominator in the last term 1− g (θ) 1−F(θ)f (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
is capturing this.
We now turn to characterization annuity and life-insurance wedges. Once we do that,
the characterization of saving wedge will be easier. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The inter-temporal wedges are given by
i. The annuity wedge:
τannuity, t (θ) =
p′t+1 (θ)
pt+1 (θ)
1− F (θ)
f (θ)
g (θ)
1− g (θ) 1−F(θ)f (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
, (17)
where g (θ) is given by(16).
ii. The life-insurance wedge is given by
τlife insurance,t (θ) = −
p′t+1 (θ)
1− pt+1 (θ)
1− F (θ)
f (θ)
g (θ)
1− g (θ) 1−F(θ)f (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
, (18)
iii. The annuity (life-insurance) wedge is positive (negative), if and only if survival is positively
correlated with labor productivity, i.e., p′t+1 (θ) > 0.
The mechanics of the above results can be understood from inspecting the incentive
constraint in (10). When survival is positively correlated with labor productivity, an in-
crease in ct+1 (θ) leads to an increase in the right hand side of (10). This implies that such
an increase is costly for redistribution since a government with redistributive motives de-
sires utility profile U (θ) to be constant or decreasing. Thus second period consumption
should be distorted downwards, i.e., annuitization margin should be taxed.
On the contrary, an increase in bequests, bt+1 (θ), decreases the right hand side of
the incentive constraint in (10). As a result bequests are beneficial in that they make
redistribution easier, since they relax the incentive constraint. Therefore, bequests should
be distorted upwards, i.e., life-insurance margin should be subsidized.
Intuitively, the idea behind the optimal tax on annuity income is similar to that of la-
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bor income taxes. Since productive individuals have an incentive to under-report their
productivity type, annuity purchases for any given type must be taxed so that under-
reporting by higher productivity individuals are less attractive since they value future
consumption at a higher rate. Similarly, bequests should be subsidized so that more
productive individuals find under-reporting less attractive since they care less about be-
quests.
An alternative , and more relevant, measure of distortions to the saving decision is the
saving wedge defined as the income lost from saving in the form of a risk-free asset, i.e.,
τun,t (θ) – a measure of saving distortions that is more commonly studied in the literature.
Multiplying the formulas in (17) and (18) by pt+1 (θ) and 1− pt+1 (θ), respectively and
summing the resulting equations implies that
β(1+ r)
u′ (ct (θ))
=
pt+1 (θ)
u′ (ct+1 (θ))
+
1− pt+1 (θ)
w′ (bt+1 (θ))
. (19)
Equation (19) is known as Inverse Euler Equation. This equation describes a necessary
condition that emerges in many dynamic incentive problems (see Kocherlakota (2010) for
an extended discussion) in which the source of private information is a shock which does
not directly affect marginal utility of consumption. To our knowledge, this is the first
paper that derives this result as a necessary condition for efficiency in an environment
with no shock in which source of private information directly affect marginal utility con-
sumption (because of the term P(θ)u′(c1(θ))). The intuition for this result is very close to
its counterparts in the New Dynamic Public Finance literature and we refer the reader to
associated papers for a detailed discussion of this relationship.
Proposition 2. The optimal wedge on un-contingent saving is given by
τun,t(θ)
1− τun,t(θ) =
pt+1(θ)
1− p′t+1(θ)pt+1(θ)
1−F(θ)
f (θ)
g(θ)
1−g(θ) 1−F(θ)f (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
+
1− pt+1(θ)
1+
p′t+1(θ)
1−pt+1(θ)
1−F(θ)
f (θ)
g(θ)
1−g(θ) 1−F(θ)f (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
− 1.
(20)
Moreover, the wedge is larger if p′t+1(θ) > 0 is larger.
The above results regarding taxation of annuities and un-contingent assets, points to-
wards the key part of our policy reform. That is, saving distortions must be used specially
when mortality differentials, as measured by p′t+1 (θ). As we discuss later - in Section 4,
these mortality differentials are the largest for ages above 65, i.e., post retirement. Thus
post-retirement asset taxes and subsidies could be a potential source of efficient provision
of saving incentives and part of an optimal reform of retirement financing.
16
Note that since survival probability is bounded above by one, as productivity con-
verges to ∞ survival differentials disappear. Hence, τa (and τb, τk) converges to zero as
θ → ∞. This implies that in the limit, the top tax rate formula implied by the analysis in
Saez (2001) holds in our model. This result suggests that mortality differentials, mostly
affect optimal taxes for lower and the middle part of the earnings distribution and do not
affect our understanding of factors affecting taxation of the rich.
The idea that future consumption (or savings) should be taxed in order to provide
incentive for labor supply can be connected to the literature on optimal taxation and
preference heterogeneity. Starting from Tuomala (1990) and extended by many others
including Saez (2002), Golosov et al. (2013) and Piketty and Saez (2013), it has been ar-
gued that when high earners prefer certain types of goods, taxation of these goods can
contribute positively to redistribution and should be used. While our result has a similar
flavor, there is a key difference. It is that survival not only affects preferences but also it
affects resources. In particular, in our model, absent heterogeneity in labor productivity,
the annuity wedge must be zero even in presence of mortality differentials. This is not
necessarily true when the only difference across individuals is preference heterogeneity.
3.3 Optimal Taxes
So far, we have mainly focused on optimal allocations. In this section, we describe how
to back out the optimal taxes from the optimal allocations and wedges discussed above.
The following lemma establishes the possibility of constructing tax and transfer sched-
ules as in (8) and (9) such that individual optimizations’ first order conditions are satis-
fied: (in what follows we adopt the following notation to avoid clutter; uc,t (θ) ≡ u′ (ct (θ)),
vl,t (θ) ≡ v′ (lt (θ)) and wb,t (θ) ≡ w′ (bt (θ)) .)
Lemma 3. Consider an allocation {ct (θ) , lt (θ) , bt (θ)} that satisfies implementability constraint
(10), and such that b′t (θ) > 0, (ϕt (θ) lt (θ))
′ > 0 and
T
∑
s=t
βsPs (θ)
[
uc,s (θ) c′s (θ) + β (1− ps+1 (θ))wb,s+1 (θ) b′s+1 (θ)− vl,s (θ) (ϕs (θ) ls (θ))′
]
> 0.
Then tax and transfer functions Ta,t (·) , Tb,t (·) , Ty,t (·) , St together with asset holdings at (θ)
exists so that the allocations {ct (θ) , lt (θ) , bt (θ) , at (θ)} satisfy the budget constraints (8) and
(9) and the first order conditions associated with the individual optimization.
Proof. We start by writing the first order conditions for the the maximization problem
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above for an individual of type θ
1− T′y,t (ϕt (θ) lt (θ)) =
v′ (lt (θ))
ϕt (θ) uc,t (θ)
, (21)
uct = β (1+ r)
[
pt+1
(
1− T′a,t+1
)
uct+1 + (1− pt+1)
(
1− T′b,t+1
)
wb,t+1
]
(22)
Equation (21) is the individual intra-temporal optimality condition and equation (22) is
the individual euler equation. We know from discussion in Section 3.2 that this euler
equation must be distorted at the efficient allocation. Therefore, optimal marginal taxes
T′a,t+1 and T
′
b,t+1 are different from zero.
We can use equation (21) to back out the optimal marginal taxes on labor earning
at each age. This is possible because the efficient allocations of consumption and hours
come directly from solving the planning problem. Thus, the earnings taxes can simply be
defined by integrating over the implied marginal rate in (21) - this is well-defined since
output in each age is increasing in θ.
The calculation of optimal asset taxes is not straight forward. More importantly, the
level of assets a cannot be pinned down independent from the marginal taxes T′a,t+1 and
T′b,t+1. Therefore, we are going to assume that asset holdings of the lowest type is zero
for all ages. This implies that in the equilibrium that decentralized efficient allocations,
the poorest individual is hand-to-mouth in all ages. Given this restriction we can use the
following procedure to find the optimal asset taxes.
We can combine the equations (21) and (22) together with (8) and (9) and use extensive
algebra to show that the derivative of asset holdings with respect to θ, a′t, satisfies
a′t (θ) =
1
uc,t (θ)
T
∑
s=t
βs−t Ps (θ)
Pt (θ)
[
uc,s (θ) c′s (θ) + β (1− ps+1 (θ))wb,s+1 (θ) b′s+1 (θ)
−vl,s (θ) (ϕs (θ) ls (θ))′
]
Since by assumption at (θ) = 0, the above determines the level of asset holdings at each
age and for each type. Additionally, taxes on bequests must satisfy
bt (θ) = (1+ r) at (θ)− Tb,t ((1+ r) at (θ)) (23)
Since at (θ) and bt (θ) is determined in the optimal allocation, the above formula deter-
mines bequests taxes.
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Finally, using (23) and the Euler equation (22), we must have
1− T′a,t+1 =
uct
β (1+ r) pt+1uct+1
− 1− pt+1
pt+1
wb,t+1
uct+1
b′t+1
(1+ r) a′t+1
.
The above formula determines the marginal tax rate on asset holdings and since a′t > 0, a
well-defined tax function on asset holdings must exist. This completes the construction.
Unfortunately, we cannot derive a closed form formula for optimal taxes. However,
our implementation procedure provides a guideline on how to numerically compute the
optimal tax functions. We present these numerical derivations in Section 5.
Note that monotonicity constraints in Lemma 3 are necessary for existence of tax func-
tion. While we have no way of theoretically checking that they are satisfied, our numerical
simulations always involve a check that ensures that they are indeed satisfied. Needless
to say, in all of our simulations the monotonicity constraint are satisfied.
4 Calibration
In order to be able to conduct our policy experiments we need parametric specifications
and parameter values for the model described in Section 2. We can estimate parame-
ters for some of the model ingredients independently (e.g., wage/productivity profiles
or mortality profiles). However, in order to choose some of the model parameters (e.g,
weight of bequest in the flow utility) we need to use our model to match some targets in
the U.S. data. We describe these details below.
Earning ability profiles. Individual productivity depends on two component: a deter-
ministic age-dependent component ϕ˜(t) and type-dependent fix effect θ. Therefore, the
natural logarithm of ability is
log ϕ(θ) = log θ + log ϕ˜t.
For the deterministic part we assume a polynomial
log ϕ˜t = β0 + β1 · t + β2 · t2 + β3 · t3,
which we estimate using labor earnings data in the PSID. We follow a large part of the
literature (e.g., Altig et al. (2001), Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) and Shourideh and
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Table 1: Death Rates by Lifetime Earning Deciles for Male Age 67-71
Lifetime Earning Decilesa
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Deaths (per 1000) 369 307 286 205 204 211 204 167 142 97
asource: Waldron (2013)
Troshkin (2015)) and use the logarithm of effective reported labor earnings per hour as
a proxy for log ϕt(θ). We calculate this as the ratio of all reported labor earnings to total
reported hours. For labor earning we use the sum over a list of variables on salaries and
wages, separate bonuses, the labor portion of business income, overtime pay, tips, com-
missions, professional practice or trade payments and other miscellaneous labor income
converted to constant 2000 dollars. We use the data in Heathcote et al. (2010) who care-
fully address a number of well known issues in the raw data. The estimated parameters
are β0 = 0.879, β1 = 0.1198, β2 = −0.00171 and β0 = 7.26× 10−6.
We assume the type-dependent fix effect θ, has a Pareto-Lognormal distribution with
parameters (µθ, σθ, aθ). This distributional approximate a lognormal with parameters µθ
and σθ at low incomes and a Pareto with parameter aθ at high values. It therefore, allows
for a heavy right tail at the top of ability and earning distribution. For this reason it
is commonly used in the literature (see Golosov et al. (forthcoming), Badel and Huggett
(2014) and Heathcote and Tsujiyama (2015)). 15 We choose the tail parameter and variance
parameter to be aθ = 3 and σθ = 0.5. The location parameter is set to µθ = −1/aθ so that
log θ has mean zero. With these parameters the cross section variance of log hourly wage
in the model is 0.36. Also, the ratio of median hourly wages to bottom decile of hourly
wage is 2.3. These statistics are consistent with reported facts on cross section distribution
of hourly wage reported in Heathcote et al. (2010). Figure 2a displays a sample of our
productivity profiles.
Demographics and Mortality Profiles. We assume individuals start at age 25 and nobody
survives beyond 100 years of old. Everyone retire at age 65. Individuals have Gompertz
force of mortality
λt(θ) =
m0
θm1
(exp(m2t)/m2 − 1). (24)
Gompertz distribution is widely used in the actuarial literature that model mortality
(see Horiuchi and Coale (1982)). It is also used in Einav et al. (2010) to model differential
15See Reed and Jorgensen (2004) for more details on Pareto-Lognormal distribution, its properties and
relation to other better known distributions.
20
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Fit of the model of mortality. Figure 1a shows death rates at age 67 in the model
vs. those reported in Waldron (2013). Figure 1b is average survival probability in the
model vs. social security data
mortality. The second term in equation (24) determines the changes in mortality by age
and is common across all types. The first term is decreasing in θ and shifts mortality age
profiles. Therefore, a higher ability person has lower mortality at all ages. The key param-
eter is m1 which determines how mortality varies with ability. To choose this parameter
with use the data on mortality across lifetime earning deciles reported in Waldron (2013).
She uses Social Security Administrative data to estimates mortality differentials at ages
67-71 by lifetime earnings decile. Table 1 shows the estimated annual mortality rates for
67 to 71 year old males born in 1940. This evidence points to large differences in death
rates across different income groups with the poorest deciles almost 4 times more likely
to die than he richest decile. We use this data to calibrate parameter m1.
The parameter m2 is chosen to match average survival probability from Cohort Life Ta-
bles for the Social Security Area by Year of Birth and Sex for males of the 1940 birth cohort
(table 7 in Bell and Miller (2005) ). Finally, m0 is chosen so that mortality at age 25 is zero.
The parameters that give the best fit to the mortality data in Table 1 and average mortality
data are α0 = 0.0006, α1 = 0.5545 and α2 = 0.0855. Figure 1a shows the fit of the model
in terms of matching mortality across lifetime earnings decile in Waldron (2013). Once w
have mortality hazard λt(θ) we can find survival probability Pt (θ) = exp (−λt (θ)). A
sample of survival probabilities implied by our calibration is shown in Figure 2b.
Preferences. We assume constant relative risk aversion over consumption u (c) = c
1−σ−1
1−σ .
However, for utility over bequest we follow De Nardi (2004), Ameriks et al. (2011), Pashchenko
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Sample profiles of labor productivities (2a) and survival probabilities (2b) for
different θ types.
(2013) and De Nardi and Yang (forthcoming) and assume
w (b) = χ
(B¯ + b)1−σ − 1
1− σ .
Parameter χ determines the strength of bequest motive, while B¯ reflects the extent to
which bequests are luxury goods. If B¯ > 0, the marginal utility of bequest is bounded. At
the same time, marginal utility of large bequest declines more slowly than the marginal
utility of consumption. As a result a richer individual has stronger motive to leave be-
quest. 16 As noted in De Nardi (2004) a positive value for parameter B¯ is needed to match
the fraction of deceased who leave no bequest. 17
We assume risk aversion parameter σ = 1.5. Strength of bequest χ is chosen to match
the bequest to wealth ratio of 0.0118 as reported in Gale and Scholz (1994). To calibrate B¯
we use data on distribution of bequest reported in Hurd and Smith (2002). We choose this
parameter so that in the model 25 percent leave bequest of less than one third of median
income.18
We assume constant Frisch elasticity for disutility over hours worked
16The wealth elasticity of both realized and anticipated bequests have both been estimated to be about
1.3 (see Auten and Joulfaian (1996) and Hurd and Smith (2002)). Among single Americans who were at
least 70 years old in 1993 and died before 1995, the 30th percentile of the bequest distribution was just $2
thousand, the median was $42 thousand, and the mean was $82 thousand (Hurd and Smith (2002)).
17To make computation easier we approximate the function above by a smooth function. Therefore, in
our model everyone leaves bequest. However, for a large fraction the amount is very small.
18We normalize the data in Table 11.1 of Hurd and Smith (2002) by median household income in 1994
CPS which was $32264.
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v (l) = ψ
l1+
1
e
1+ 1e
.
with elasticity of labor supply e = 0.5. The weight of leisure in utility ψ chosen so
that the average annual hours worked in the model 2000. We choose discount factor β to
match the wealth to income ratio of 3. Depreciation rate of capital is δ = 0.06 and return
on capital net of depreciation r˜ is 0.06.19 There is a corporate income tax rate of τK = 0.33
paid by the firms. Therefore, after tax return on asset is r = 0.04. 20 This is also the inter-
est rate that government pays on its debt. We take the rerun on assets (and government
debt) fixed throughout our analyses. 21
Social security. Social security taxes are levied on labor earnings, up to a maximum tax-
able, as in the actual U.S. system. Benefits are paid as a nonlinear function of average
taxable earnings over lifetime.22 Let e be labor earning and emax be maximum taxable
earning. We set emax equal to 2.47 times the average earning in the economy. Social secu-
rity tax rate is τss = 0.124. 23 There is also an medicare tax rateτm = 0.029 which applies
to entire earning.
Each individual’s benefit is a function of his average life time earning (up to emax). We
denote this by e¯. We use the same benefit formula that the U.S. Social Security Adminis-
trations uses to determine the primary insurance amount (PIA) for retires:
Ss(e¯) =

0.9× e¯ e¯ ≤ 0.2Y¯
0.18Y¯ + 0.33× (e¯− 0.2Y¯) 0.2Y¯ < e¯ ≤ 1.24Y¯
0.5243Y¯ + 0.15× (e¯− 1.24Y¯) e¯ > 1.24Y¯
.
To account for medicare benefits, we assume each individual in retirement will receive
an additional transfer independent of their earning history. We choose this value so that
19Therefore, with capital to output ratio of 3, the steady state ratio of investment to GDP is 0.21 which is
aligned with the US average over 2000 to 2010.
20This is consistent with the average real return to stock and long-term bonds over the period 1946-2001
as reported in Siegel and Coxe (2002), Tables 1-1 and 1-2.
21In this regard, our analysis can be viewed as a partial equilibrium analysis since we do not allow return
on capital adjust as stock of capital changes. In future drafts we will endogenies return on assets and report
results in a full blown general equilibrium model.
22Social security administration uses only the highest 35 years of earning to calculate the average life
earning. We use entire earning history for easier computation.
23We account for disability insurance tax and benefits by bunching them together with social security.
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Figure 3: Calibrated effective income tax function, T (·).
the aggregate medicare benefits are 3 percent of GDP. 24
Tax function and government purchases. In addition to social security, government has
an exogenous spending G, which we assume to be 9% of GDP. 25 There is a consumption
tax τC and a nonlinear tax on labor income income. We use 5.5% for consumption tax as
calculated in McDaniel (2007) . For income tax function we use
T (y) = y− φy1−τ.
where y is the taxable income. During the working age the taxable income for each in-
dividual is ϕt(θ)lt(θ)− 0.5Tss, in which ϕt(θ)lt(θ) is labor earnings and Tss is the social
security and medicate payroll taxes that the worker pays. The second term reflects the
effective tax credit individuals get for the portion of social security tax paid by their em-
ployers. We assume retirement benefits are not taxed.
Tax function of this form are extensively used to approximate the effective income
taxes in the United States. The parameter τ determines the progressivity of the tax func-
tion, while φ determines the level (the lower φ is, the higher is the total tax revenues for a
given τ). Heathcote et al. (2014) estimate value of 0.151 for τ, using PSID income data and
income tax calculations using NBER’s TAXSIM program. We use their estimated value for
24Our analysis abstracts from the health expenditure risks that this program helps to insure. In this
regard it is similar to Huggett and Ventura (1999). Our approach can be applied to a more detailed model
that includes these risks as well as a more detailed model of Medicare benefits. We leave this for future
research.
25This is the sum of all government consumption expenditure on national defense, general public ser-
vice, public order and safety and economic affairs in NIPA Table 3.16. We use the average over the period
2000 to 2010.
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Table 2: Exogenous Parameters Chosen Outside the Model
Parameter Description Values/source
Demographics
T maximum age 75 (100 years old)
R retirement age 40 (65 years old)
λt(θ) mortality hazard see text
Preferences
σ risk aversion parameter 1.5
e elasticity of labor supply 0.5
Labor Productivity
σθ pareto-lognormal variance parameter 0.5
aθ pareto-lognormal tail parameter 3
µθ pareto-lognormal location parameter -0.33
Technology
r return on assets 0.04
Government policies
τSS, τm social security and Medicare tax rates 0.124,0.029
Ss social security benefit formula see text
τc consumption tax 0.055
τ, φ parameters of income tax function 0.151,4.74a
G government purchases 9% of GDP
D government debt 50% of GDP
aSource: Heathcote et al. (2014)
τ and choose φ. Figure 3 illustrates the resulting marginal and average taxes as functions
of annual earnings in constant 2000 dollars. 26
Finally, we assume government debt to be 50 percent of GDP. 27 To make sure the flow
government budget constraint holds in steady state, we assume that there are lump sum
transfers Tr made to all workers before retirement.
Tables 2 and 3 show the calibration summary. Tables 2 lists parameters that are ei-
ther taken from other studies or estimated/calculated independent of the model struc-
ture. Their sources and estimation/calculation procedures are outlined in previous para-
graphs.
Table 3 lists the parameters that are calibrated using the model by matching some
moments in the U.S. data. The top panel shows the moments targets in data and resulting
values in the model. The bottom pane lists the parameter values. Note that in some cases
26We cap the marginal tax rate at 40 percent to be consistent with top federal marginal tax rate in the US.
27This is sum of the state and local municipal securities and federal treasury securities. We use the
average over 2000 to 2010.
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Table 3: Parameters Calibrated Using the Model
Parameters Description Values
β discount factor 0.98
χ strength of bequest 24.18
B¯ bequest utility shifter 430410
ψ weight on leisure 5.3× 10−13
Moments Data Model
Wealth-income ratio 3 3
Bequest-wealth ratio 0.0118 0.013
Fraction with almost no bequesta 0.2 0.17
Average annual hours 2000 2000
aThis the fraction of bequests that are less than a third of median income
Figure 4: Cumulative distribution of bequest, model vs. Hurd and Smith (2002) data.
the moments are no matched exactly, although the errors are small. It is important to
remind our readers that the model is very stylized. The only motive for saving in this
model is life cycle motive as well as bequest motive. Therefore, a subjective discount rate
low enough to generate a capital-output ratio of 3, will encourage all individuals to save
higher. This in turn reduces the fraction of people who die with no asset. 28
Figure 4 displays the cumulative distribution distribution of bequests in the model
and the distribution that Hurd and Smith (2002) report from AHEAD data for decedents.
The size of bequest is normalized by median income. Despite the model inability to hit
the calibration target with regard to the fraction zero bequests, the overall distribution of
bequest compares very well to the AHEAD data.
28In contract, a model with mensurable income uncertainty the link between discount rate and saving is
weaker. Therefore, models that include this feature (e.g. De Nardi (2004)) are able to hit all the targets.
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Table 4: Distribution of Wealth
percentage of wealth in the top
Wealth Gini 1% 5% 20% 40% 60% 80%
U.S. data (SCF (1989)) 0.78 29 53 80 93 98 100
Model (status-quo) 0.60 10 29 61 82 94 99
Table 5: Distribution of Earnings
percentage of earnings in the top
Earnings Gini 1% 5% 20% 40% 80%
U.S. data (CPS (1994)) 0.46 6 19 48 72 98
Model (status-quo) 0.48 5 16 44 68 96
The model also does a reasonable job at matching distribution of wealth, except maybe
at the very top. The first line in Table 4 displays Gini coefficient and the distribution of
wealth in the U.S. from SCF (1989). The second line in the Table shows the implied dis-
tribution from the model. The difficulties of economic models in generating high con-
centration of the wealth at the top is well known. In particular, in a model with no en-
trepreneurial risk (e.g., Cagetti and De Nardi (2009)), no extreme income risk (e.g., Cas-
taneda et al. (2003)) and no direct intergenerational link (e.g., De Nardi (2004)) the share of
wealth at the top is far below the data. However, despite that, the distribution of wealth
in our model compares well with data, in particular for the poorer individuals. 29
The first line in Table 5 displays the distribution of earnings for individuals age 25
to 60 in CPS. The second line is the distribution of earnings implied by model. As it is
evident, the model matches distribution of earning quite well.
5 Optimal Policy Reform: Numerical Results
We now use the the calibrated model to solve numerically for the allocation of consump-
tion, hours and bequests for each productivity type θ in steady state under the status-quo
policies described in Section 4. We use these allocations to compute the lifetime wel-
fare under the status-quo policies. This the present discounted value of expected utility
from consumption, bequest and hours that each productivity type θ experiences under
the status-quo policies. These status-quo life time welfares are the inputs to the planning
problem.
29Adding more features to the model in the interest of getting a better match of wealth distribution is
straight-forward. However, this will make our normative analysis much more complicated and it is outside
the scope of this paper.
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Given the status-quo lifetime welfares, using the parametrization described in Sec-
tion 4, we can solve for the efficient allocations. These are the allocations that solve the
problem (11) described in Section 3.1.
Our goal in this section is to first make a case for policy reforms by comparing intra-
temporal and inter-temporal distortions in the status-quo economy and the efficient allo-
cation. Motivation for policy reform arises from the differences between distortions under
status-quo policies under efficient allocations. We can then, use the procedure outlined in
Section 3.3 to solve for optimal policies that implement efficient distortions in the econ-
omy. Finally, we report the effect that optimal reform has on individual choices, macro
aggregates and government budget.
5.1 Distortions: status-quo vs efficient allocations
As we argued in Section 3.2 one property of efficient allocation is that the inter-temporal
margins (as well al intra-temporal margins) are distorted. In other words, marginal rate
substitution (between consumption in consecutive periods, or between consumption and
bequest) is not equal to actuarially fair prices. We call these distortions wedges. We use
the following formula, to compute these wedges for each productivity type θ at each age.
τannuity,t (θ) = 1−
u′ (ct (θ))
β (1+ r) u′ (ct+1 (θ))
,
τlife insurance,t (θ) = 1−
u′ (ct (θ))
β (1+ r)w′ (bt+1 (θ))
,
τlabor,t (θ) = 1−
v′ (lt (θ))
ϕt (θ) u′ (ct (θ))
.
We do the calculations both for efficient allocations and the status-quo allocations. The
resulting wedges are plotted in Figure 5.
Figure 5a shows the inter-temporal distortions on the annuitization margin (marginal
rate of substitution between consumption at age t and t + 1). There are three important
observations. First, this margin is positively distorted (effectively taxed) both in status-
quo economy and efficient allocations. Second, these distortions are large. Third, there
is a rather large difference between efficient distortions and distortions in the status-quo
economy. This difference is the key to understanding the sign and magnitude of optimal
taxes. Note that if the distortions in status-quo economy and efficient allocation were
equal, then there would be no justification for government intervention in the asset mar-
ket (i.e. taxing or subsidizing the asset accumulation). Annuitization margin is distorted
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(a) Inter-temporal (annuity) distortions (b) Inter-temporal (life insurance) distortions
(c) Intra-temporal (labor) distortions
Figure 5: Status quo distortions vs efficient distortions.
in the status-quo economy due to missing annuity markets. 30 For each type θ, there is
a gap between the rate of return on assets in market, r, and the actuarially fair return
on annuity for that type, r + 1 − pt+1(θ)pt(θ) . Since mortality is higher for individuals with
lower ability, this gap is larger for these individuals. The dashed lines in 5a show these
distortions for two difference ages.
The solid lines in Figure 5a show distortions that result from the efficient allocations.
The reason that annuitization margins are distorted under the efficient allocation is the
following. In this environment, individuals with higher labor productivity have lower
mortality. As the result, they place more weight on future consumption (than a lower
30Our findings do not depend on strong assumption of missing annuity market. These findings are valid
as long as there is imperfection in the annuity market and individuals are not paid the actuarially fair rates
on their annuities.
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(a) Asset Tax Functions (b) Bequest Tax Functions
(c) Labor Tax Functions
Figure 6: Optimal Tax Functions
productivity individual). Taxing the annuity income of the lower ability individuals re-
duce the incentive for higher ability to shirk. Instead, they will have incentive to work
harder, earn more income when young and benefit from lower distortion on the annuiti-
zation when they are old. This, in turn, lowers the distortionary cost of taxation for the
government. The size of these distortions depend on mortality differentials (the differ-
ences in mortality across different productivity types).
The discussion above highlights the deep reasons why there is inter-temporal distor-
tions under efficient allocation and under the status-quo polices and why they are differ-
ent. In our model the main rationale for asset taxes is to close this gap. Since status-quo
distortions are alway higher than the efficient distortions, the optimal policy has a nega-
tive sign, i.e. they are subsidies.
Figure 5b shows the distortions along the life insurance margin (marginal rate of sub-
30
stitution between consumption at age t and bequest at age t + 1). The dashed lines are
distortions under status-quo economy. Solid lines are distortions under efficient alloca-
tion. The observations here are similar to the ones discussed in the previous paragraph,
with opposite signs. Under status-quo, due to missing annuity market, individuals die
with more than desired assets (due to precautionary saving motive). This reflects in large
negative wedge (effective subsidy) on life insurance margin. Under efficient allocation,
the distortions along life insurance margin are smaller, i.e. (effective subsidies to leave be-
quest are smaller). 31 Therefore, there is need for government to intervene with a positive
bequest tax.
Finally, Figure 5c shows distortions along intra-temporal margin (marginal rate of sub-
station between consumption and hours worked). In the status-quo economy these dis-
tortions arise from the distortionary tax on labor income. 32 Under the efficient allocations
they depend on elasticity of labor supply, tail properties of ability distribution and the
planner’s redistribution motive. Since, by construction, we do not alter the distribution
of welfare in the economy, the overall shape of the distortion under efficient allocation is
very similar to the status-quo. This implies that under optimal reform policies, marginal
tax on labor income is very similar to status-quo marginal taxes.
5.2 Optimal Policies
We now follow the procedure outlined in Section 3.3 to solve for system of optimal
tax and transfers. These are: 1) non-linear, age dependent tax on assets upon survival
Ta,t ((1+ r) at), 2) non-linear, age dependent tax on bequests upon death Tb,t ((1+ r) at),
3) non-linear, age dependent tax on labor income Ty,t (yt), 3) Transfer to workers before
retirement Trt, and 4) Transfer to workers after retirement, St. Note that transfer are the
independent of individual choices but they dependent on age.
Figure 6 show resulting marginal and average tax functions for select ages. As we
argued in Section 5.1, in the absence of annuity market individuals do not receive actu-
arially fair return on their assets. In that regard assets are too expensive, and more so
for poorer individuals who have higher mortality. Therefore, marginal subsidies on as-
set must be higher for poorer individuals. Therefore, asset taxes are progressive (Figure
6a). On the other hand, bequest taxes are regressive (Figure 6b) and assets of the poor is
subject to up to 100 percent taxes when they die. This arise from the luxury good prop-
31The reasoning on why they are needed under efficient allocations are analogous to the discussion for
annuitization distortions.
32The nonlinear income tax together with social security and medicate tax on earnings, up to a maximum
taxable earning.
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Table 6: Sources of Retirement Income
Share of public transfers in retirement income (%)
Income Quartiles Dataa Status-quo Efficient
1st 95 94 89
2nd 90 84 77
3rd 67 75 64
4th 34 53 34
aSource: Table 6 in Poterba (2014).
erty of bequests. Poorer individuals have no demand for bequest (or they have very little
demand). However, they must accumulate assets to finance retirement. The high tax on
their bequests ensures that they do not leave too much bequest.
Figure 6c shows marginal and average tax on labor income. As argued before, these
are very similar to tax functions in the status-quo economy.
5.3 Sources of retirement income
The composition of retirement income under optimal policy are not very different from
status-quo economy. Table 6 summarizes the share of social security income form total re-
tirement income under status-quo and optimal reform. For comparisons we also include
this ratio in CPS data (reported in Poterba (2014)).33 The ratio in the model is close to the
CPS data, particularly for the lower half of the income distribution. Under the optimal
reform, the ratio stays very close to the status-quo.
One feature of the optimal reform policies is the uniform social security benefits that
are independent of history of earning. To show how these benefit compare the status-quo
economy we plot the replacement ratios under two systems in Figure 7a. These are the
ratio of retirement benefits to the average lifetime earnings (equivalent to social security’s
average indexed monthly earnings, AIME). The replacement ratios under optimal reform
are lower than status-quo for most of the population, except for bottom 20 percent of
lifetime earning.
Figure 7b shows the ratio of pre and post retirement consumption between efficient
allocation and status-quo. The pre retirement consumption falls a little under efficient
allocation while post retirement consumption increases by up to 30 percent for the lowest
income decile.
33To make these number comparable to our model we exclude labor earning. We also aggregate pension
income together with asset income.
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(a) Replacement ratio (b) Ratio of consumption
Figure 7: Figure 7a shows the replacement ratios under status-quo and efficient alloca-
tion. Figure 7b is the ratio of consumption to status-quo consumption in pre and post
retirement, by lifetime income deciles.
Table 7: Earnings Distribution
percentage of earnings in the top
Earnings Gini 1% 5% 20% 40% 80%
U.S. data (CPS (1994)) 0.46 6 19 48 72 98
Model (status-quo) 0.48 5 16 44 68 96
Model (efficient) 0.49 5 17 46 69 96
5.4 Distributional, aggregate and budgetary effects
Tables 7 and 8 report the distribution of earning and assets. As we see the optimal reform
policies do not have large effect on the distribution of earnings and assets in the economy.
The distribution of bequest, however, changes considerably (Figure 8). In particular, the
fraction of individual who leave zero bequest increases to about 60 percent. The reason is
that bequests are luxury good and they are not an efficient way to deliver utility to poorer
individual. Therefore, heavy tax on them are optimal.
Table 8: Wealth Distribution
percentage of wealth in the top
Wealth Gini 1% 5% 20% 40% 60% 80%
U.S. data (SCF (1989)) 0.78 29 53 80 93 98 100
Model (status-quo) 0.60 10 29 61 82 94 99
Model (efficient) 0.60 10 29 62 83 94 99
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Figure 8: Distribution of bequest: status-quo vs efficient vs Hurd and Smith (2002) data
Table 9 shows how the optimal reform affect aggregate quantities. The first column
shows the steady state values of aggregate quantities relative to GDP in the status-quo
economy. The second column shows the same quantities under optimal reform.
The optimal reform reduces present discounted value of all transfers net of taxes to a
generation by 15 percent. This extra resource is used in the economy to accumulate capital
and running down government debt. This is almost by assumption. We do not take a
stand on how the society decides to spend its free resources. They can, in principle, be
transferred back to individuals. In that case the government debt does not fall. However,
the increased incentive for saving will still induce more capital accumulation.34 As a
result of more capital accumulation, GDP goes up by about 8 percent. However, labor
earnings fall about 1.5 percent due to fall in hours worked. 35
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed optimal policy reforms of retirement financing, i.e., reform that
intend to separate the efficiency of such schemes from its distributional consequences.
Our optimal reform approach points towards the importance of saving distortions - taxa-
tion of bequests and subsidization of asset holdings, late in life. The important ingredient
of our analysis is the fact that individuals have differential mortalities and this is corre-
lated with their earning ability.
34The stock of capital is uniquely determined. Its ownership depends on the details of transfers.
35Some of these effects are due the fact that we do not let factor prices adjust. In future versions of the
paper we will report numbers with endogenous wages and return on capital.
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Table 9: Aggregate effect of policy reforms
value relative to GDP
Status-quo Reform (efficient)
Consumption 0.70 0.67
Capital 3.00 3.46
Government Debt 0.50 -0.06
Net Worth 3.53 3.43
Total Tax Revenue 0.23 0.23
Labor income 0.14 0.13
Consumption 0.04 0.04
Capital 0.06 0.07
Bequest 0.00 0.04
Asset Subsidy 0.00 -0.05
Total Transfers 0.13 0.14
Post retirement 0.09 0.07
Pre retirement 0.04 0.07
To keep our analysis tractable we have focused on permanent ability types and ab-
stracted form idiosyncratic shocks that are the focus of most of optimal dynamic tax lit-
erature. Inclusion of these shocks introduces additional reasons for taxing capital (as in
Golosov et al. (2003) and Golosov et al. (forthcoming)) in the pre-retirement period. As
shown by others, such shocks induce very little reason to tax capital income (see Farhi
and Werning (2012)), compared to the magnitude of our saving distortions. Hence, we
have good reasons to believe that including shocks to earnings does not alter our results.
A key feature of our model is the correlation between earning ability and mortality. In
choosing this assumption we are guided by large body of evidence that points to a strong
correlation between socio-economic factors (such as income or education) and mortality
rates. We take an extreme view and assume that this correlation is exogenously given
and individuals’ choice has no effect on their mortality. In reality, many individuals affect
their mortality through the decisions they make over their lifetime. We choose to ignore
these effects due to two reasons. First, as Ales et al. (2014) show, when individuals differ
in their earning ability, and mortality is endogenous, efficiency implies more investment
in the survival of the higher ability individuals. Hence, it is never efficient to eliminate
the correlation between ability and mortality. Second, in any model in which the length
of life is endogenous, the level of utility flow becomes important in marginal decisions by
individuals. This makes analysis of such models very complicated and intractable. It is
important, however, to know how inclusion of endogenous mortality affects our analysis
of optimal policy. We leave this for future research.
35
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Consider the individual maximization problem for type θ where hours lt (θ) are
replaced by yt (θ) = ϕt (θ) lt (θ).
U (θ) = max
ct,yt,at+1,bt+1
T
∑
t=0
βtPt (θ)
[
u(ct)− v
(
yt
ϕt (θ)
)
+ β (1− pt+1 (θ))w(bt+1)
]
40
subject to
(1+ τc) ct + at+1 =
(
yt − Ty,t (yt)
)
1 [t < R] + (1+ r) at − Ta,t ((1+ r) at) + St,
bt = (1+ r) at+1 − Tb,t ((1+ r) at+1) .
Note that θ does not appear in the budget constraint. Now take envelope condition with
respect to θ
U′ (θ) =
T
∑
t=0
βtP′t (θ)
[
u(ct)− v
(
yt
ϕt (θ)
)
+ β (1− pt+1 (θ))w(bt+1)
]
+
T
∑
t=0
βtPt (θ)
ϕ′t (θ) yt
ϕt (θ)
2 v
′
(
yt
ϕt (θ)
)
−
T
∑
t=0
βt+1Pt (θ) p′t+1 (θ)w(bt+1)
=
T
∑
t=0
βtP′t (θ)
[
u(ct)− v
(
yt
ϕt (θ)
)]
+
T
∑
t=0
βtPt (θ)
[
ϕ′t (θ) yt
ϕt (θ)
2 v
′
(
yt
ϕt (θ)
)
+
(
P′t (θ)− P′t+1 (θ)
Pt (θ)
)
βw(bt+1)
]
where the last equality is because P′t+1 (θ) = (Pt (θ) · pt+1 (θ))′ = P′t (θ) · pt+1 (θ) + Pt (θ) ·
p′t+1 (θ). Now, replace lt =
yt
ϕt(θ)
and evaluate at the solution {ct (θ) , lt (θ) , bt (θ)}
U′ (θ) =
T
∑
t=0
βtP′t (θ) [u(ct (θ))− v (lt (θ))]
+
T
∑
t=0
βtPt (θ)
[
ϕ′t (θ) lt (θ)
ϕt (θ)
v′ (lt (θ)) +
(
P′t (θ)− P′t+1 (θ)
Pt (θ)
)
βw(bt+1 (θ))
]
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let dF (θ) = f (θ) dθ where f (θ) is the density function. Let η (θ) f (θ), µ (θ) f (θ)
and γ (θ) f (θ) be multipliers on equations (12), (13) and (14) respectively. The first order
41
conditions for this problem are (
η (θ) + µ (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt (θ)
)
u′ (ct (θ)) =
1
βt (1+ r)t
(25)(
η (θ) + µ (θ)
P′t (θ)− P′t+1 (θ)
Pt (θ)− Pt+1 (θ)
)
w′ (bt+1 (θ)) =
1
βt+1 (1+ r)t+1
(26)(
η (θ)− µ (θ) ϕ
′
t (θ)
ϕt (θ)
(
1+ lt (θ)
v′′ (lt (θ))
v′ (lt (θ))
)
+ µ (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt (θ)
)
v′ (lt (θ)) =
ϕt (θ)
βt (1+ r)t
(27)
η (θ)− µ (θ) f
′ (θ)
f (θ)
− γ (θ) = µ′ (θ) , (28)
and the boundary conditions
µ (θ) = µ
(
θ¯
)
= 0.
Combine Equations (25) and (27) and let εF,t (θ) =
v′(lt(θ))
v′′(lt(θ))lt(θ) .
v′ (lt (θ))
ϕt (θ) u′ (ct (θ))
=
η (θ) + µ (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
η (θ) + µ (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
− µ (θ) ϕ′t(θ)ϕt(θ)
(
1+ lt (θ)
v′′(lt(θ))
v′(lt(θ))
)
=
η (θ) + µ (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
η (θ) + µ (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
− µ (θ) ϕ′t(θ)ϕt(θ) (1+ 1/εF,t (θ))
.
Therefore,
τlabor,t (θ) = 1−
v′ (lt (θ))
ϕt (θ) u′ (ct (θ))
=
−µ (θ) ϕ′t(θ)ϕt(θ) (1+ 1/εF,t (θ))
η (θ) + µ (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
− µ (θ) ϕ′t(θ)ϕt(θ) (1+ 1/εF,t (θ))
and
τlabor,t (θ)
1− τlabor,t (θ)
=
−µ(θ)
η(θ)
ϕ′t(θ)
ϕt(θ)
(1+ 1/εF,t (θ))
1+ µ(θ)
η(θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
(29)
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Now, note that from Equation (25), η (θ) = 1u′(c0(θ)) . Form (28) we can solve for µ (θ)
µ (θ) = − 1
f (θ)
ˆ θ¯
θ
(
η
(
θ˜
)− γ (θ˜)) dF (θ˜)
= − 1
f (θ)
ˆ θ¯
θ
1
u′
(
c0
(
θ˜
)) (1− γ (θ˜) u′ (c0 (θ˜))) dF (θ˜)
= −1− F (θ)
f (θ)
ˆ θ¯
θ
1
u′
(
c0
(
θ˜
)) (1− γ (θ˜) u′ (c0 (θ˜))) dF (θ˜)1− F (θ)
= −η (θ) 1− F (θ)
f (θ)
ˆ θ¯
θ
u′ (c0 (θ))
u′
(
c0
(
θ˜
)) (1− γ (θ˜) u′ (c0 (θ˜))) dF (θ˜)1− F (θ) .
Therefore,
−µ (θ)
η (θ)
=
(
1− F (θ)
f (θ)
)
g (θ) ,
where
g (θ) =
ˆ θ¯
θ
u′ (c0 (θ))
u′
(
c0
(
θ˜
)) (1− γ (θ˜) u′ (c0 (θ˜))) dF (θ˜)1− F (θ) .
By replacing these back into (29) we get Equation (15).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. From Equation (25)
u′ (ct (θ))
β(1+ r)u′ (ct+1 (θ))
=
η (θ) + µ (θ)
P′t+1(θ)
Pt+1(θ)
η (θ) + µ (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
Therefore,
τannuity,t (θ) = 1−
u′ (ct (θ))
β(1+ r)u′ (ct+1 (θ))
=
µ(θ)
η(θ)
(
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
− P′t+1(θ)Pt+1(θ)
)
1+ µ(θ)
η(θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
=
−µ(θ)
η(θ)
p′t+1(θ)
pt+1(θ)
1+ µ(θ)
η(θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
=
p′t+1 (θ)
pt+1 (θ)
(
1− F (θ)
f (θ)
)
g (θ)
1−
(
1−F(θ)
f (θ)
)
g (θ) P
′
t (θ)
Pt(θ)
.
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The second equality is true because P
′
t (θ)
Pt(θ)
− P′t+1(θ)Pt+1(θ) =
p′t+1(θ)
pt+1(θ)
. The derivation of Equation
(18) is similar.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Recall that
τun,t (θ) = 1− u
′ (ct (θ))
β(1+ r) [pt+1 (θ) u′ (ct+1 (θ)) + (1− pt+1 (θ))w′ (bt+1 (θ))]
= 1− 1
β(1+ r)
[
pt+1 (θ)
u′(ct+1(θ))
u′(ct(θ)) + (1− pt+1 (θ))
w′(bt+1(θ))
u′(ct(θ))
]
= 1− 1
pt+1(θ)
1−τannuity,t(θ)
+ 1−pt+1(θ)1−τlife insurance,t(θ)
.
Therefore,
τun,t (θ)
1− τun,t (θ) =
pt+1 (θ)
1− τannuity,t (θ)
+
1− pt+1 (θ)
1− τlife insurance,t (θ)
− 1.
Now replace formulas for the annuity and life insurance wedges
τun,t (θ)
1− τun,t (θ) =
pt+1 (θ)
1− p′t+1(θ)pt+1(θ)
1−F(θ)
f (θ)
g(θ)
1−g(θ) 1−F(θ)f (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
+
1− pt+1 (θ)
1+
p′t+1(θ)
1−pt+1(θ)
1−F(θ)
f (θ)
g(θ)
1−g(θ) 1−F(θ)f (θ)
P′t (θ)
Pt(θ)
− 1.
Note that pt+1 (θ)
(
1− τannuity,t (θ)
)
+(1− pt+1 (θ))
(
1− τlife insurance,t (θ)
)
= 1. There-
fore, for larger p′t+1 (θ) the denumerator in the right hand side becomes a mean preserv-
ing spread. As a result, the expected value of its inverse increases as spread (i.e., p′t+1 (θ))
increases - under the assumption that everything else remains constant.
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